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Comments
TIMELINESS OF SETTLEMENT OF CORPORATION
TAXES BY THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA
ScoPE
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania settles a tax return by
notifying the taxpayer that the return is accepted as filed or as
corrected with taxpayer having the right to appeal.1 Statutes2
provide that settlement of corporation taxes must be made by the
Commonwealth within one year "as far as possible." This language
has been the subject of litigation to determine the Common-
wealth's requirement to settle within a one year period.
Three Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions s have dealt di-
1. For a discussion of the settlement procedure see text accompany-
ing notes 32-37 infra.
2. PA. STAT. AIw. tit. 72, § 7420h(2) (1964), on settlement of cor-
porate net income taxes states:
All taxes due under this act shall be settled by the department,
and such settlement shall be subject to audit and approved by the
Department of the Auditor General, and shall, so far as possible,
be made so that notice thereof may reach the taxpayer before the
end of a year after the tax report was required to be made. (em-
phasis added).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 801(c) (1949), on settlement of capital stock tax
states:
All such settlements shall, as far as possible, be so made that notice
thereof may reach the taxpayer before the end of the year succeed-
ing the year for which the tax or bonus report or return was
made or ought to have been made (emphasis added).
3. Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 435 Pa. 525, 257 A.2d 530
(1969); Commonwealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 423 Pa. 101,
223 A.2d 223, aff'g on reargument, 419 Pa. 497, 223 A.2d 223 (1966); Com-
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rectly with the question of timeliness of settlement and have
limited the Commonwealth in justifying lateness of settlement.
In Commonwealth v. Allied Building Credits, Inc.4 the court held
that the burden was on the Commonwealth to show a "reasonable"
excuse for the delay. This rule was followed by the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas' in six cases. 6 Ten years later,
Commonwealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp.7 held that
generally the only valid justification of a delay is one that origi-
nates with the taxpayer.8 Recently, Commonwealth v. Western
Maryland Ry. 9 although it followed Safe Harbor, implied that the
Commonwealth would be justified in a delay if it was unable to
act or under a disability which prevented it from settling on a
timely basis.
This Comment will analyze the judicial interpretation of the
tax settlement statutes, discuss their effect on the Commonwealth
and the taxpayer, and propose methods for stablizing this area
of the law.
THE REASONABLE ExcUSE RuLE
The reasonable excuse rule was developed in Commonwealth v.
Allied Building Credits, Inc.l0 The conflict concerning timeliness
of tax settlement was caused by the words "as far as possible" in
the statute. On one extreme, if the words were merely descrip-
tive, the Commonwealth would have a mandatory settlement time
of one year. The opposite interpretation could give the Common-
wealth an unlimited time for settlement.
monwealth v. Allied Bldg. Credits, Inc., 385 Pa. 370, 123 A.2d 686 (1956).
4. Commonwealth v. Allied Bldg. Credits, Inc., 385 Pa. 370, 123 A.2d
686 (1956).
5. Claims for refunds are appealed from the Board of Finance and
Revenue to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, § 504 (Supp. 1969).
6. Commonwealth v. Tonopah Mining Co., 83 Dauph. 279 (C.P. Pa.
1965); Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Mfr.'s Ass'n. Cas. Ins. Co., 76
Dauph. 275 (C.P. Pa. 1960), exceptions on other grounds overruled, 78
Dauph. 28 (C.P. Pa. 1961), modified on other grounds, 410 Pa. 207, 188 A.2d
729 (1963); Commonwealth v. Anndale Co., 75 Dauph. 250 (C.P. Pa. 1960);
Commonwealth v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 75 Dauph. 106 (C.P. Pa. 1960); Com-
monwealth v. Lehval Indus., Inc., 75 Dauph. 254 (C.P. Pa. 1959); Com-
monwealth v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 71 Dauph. 7 (C.P. Pa. 1957).
7. Commonwealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 423 Pa. 101,
223 A.2d 223, aff'g on reargument, 419 Pa. 497, 223 A.2d 223 (1966).
8. 423 Pa. at 105, 223 A.2d at 226.
9. Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 435 Pa. 525, 257 A.2d 530
(1969).
10. 385 Pa. 370, 123 A.2d 686 (1956).
The Allied court was required by the Statutory Construction
Act to "... ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legis-
lature ... -"" It was guided by certain statutory presumptions.
12
The court relied upon two such presumptions: (1) "That the legis-
lature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execu-
tion or unreasonable,""' and (2) "That the legislature intends the
entire statute to be effective and certain."'14 Since the one year
settlement period 15 plus the two year statutory resettlement pe-
riod"' added together equal the three year statutory record keep-
ing period,17 the court, to give effect to the overall statute, held
that the one year settlement period must be strictly followed.
If the settlement period is unlimited, then the statutorily required
period for keeping records would not have significance.' 8 The
statute should also be strictly construed under the Statutory Con-
struction Act.' 9 The court cited cases dealing with statutory
construction and stated:
In the light of this voluminous case authority we feel that
Section 8 (a) of the Corporate Net Income Tax Law, a tax-
ing statute, falls under the rule of strict construction.
Since that section requires a certain act to be done for the
protection of the taxpayer it must be strictly construed.20
Relying heavily upon the Black's Law Dictionary2' defini-
tion of "possible,' 22 the court construed the phrase "as far as
possible" as subjecting the Commonwealth to the burden of proof
to show that it would be unreasonable to require the Common-
wealth to settle within the required time rather than as making
the one year provision mandatory. 3 The court reasoned, that
provided the Commonwealth had a reasonable excuse, it Would be
justified in making settlement after the one year period. Since
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 551 (1969).
12. Id. § 552.
13. Id. § 552(1).
14. Id. § 552(2).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420h(8) (a) (1964).
16. Id. § 3420h(8) (c).
17. Id. § 3420h(10).
18. 385 Pa. at 374, 123 A.2d at 689.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558 (1969): "All provisions of a law
... shall be strictly construed:
(3) Provisions imposing taxes;."
20. 385 Pa. at 377, 123 A.2d at 690-91.
21. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1328 (4th ed. 1951).
22. 385 Pa. at 377, 123 A.2d at 691:
Black's Law Dictionary (4th Ed.) defines the word 'possible' as:'capable of existing, happening, being, becoming, or coming to pass;
feasible, not contrary to the nature of things; neither necessitated
nor precluded; free to happen or not, contrasted with necessary
and impossible.' Applying this definition to the phrase 'so far as
possible' we find it capable of the following construction: so far
as capable of happening, so far as capable of coming to pass, so far
as feasible, contrasted with necessary and impossible. From this
analysis it is apparent that the term as used in the Act would carry
with it the notion of 'reasonableness' or 'within reason'.
23. 385 Pa. at 377-78, 123 A.2d at 691.
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the Commonwealth had not presented evidence to excuse the de-
lay, the decision for the taxpayer was affirmed.
2 4
THE COMMONwEALTH'S EXCUSES FOR DELAY
The Commonwealth has presented several reasons to justify
its delays;25 however, under the holding in Commonwealth v.
Allied Building Credits, Inc. 26 only a "reasonable" excuse would
justify a late settlement. Several excuses have been found to be
reasonable by the Pennsylvania courts prior to Commonwealth v.
Safe Harbor Water Power Corp.27 The Commonwealth felt that
these excuses were necessary for their effective operation.
Pairing
The most frequent excuse of the Commonwealth is pairing,
which is basically the comparison of one tax return with another.
Pairing is an important tool that is used to insure accuracy. Three
types of pairing are commonly used.
The first is the comparison of one year's tax return with the
same type of return for the preceding year. This is done for both
capital stock and corporate net income tax returns. This method of
pairing enables the Commonwealth to compare the current year's
beginning asset balances with the prior year's ending balances.2
The ratios used in computing capital stock tax are dependent upon
the value of the assets. A change in the beginning balance of an
asset account will normally change the ending balance which is
used in the tax calculation. This is one reason why it appears
necessary to have the prior year settled before settling the current
return; in order to insure an accurate tax settlement of the current
return.
•24. Id. at 378-79, 123 A.2d at 691.
25. The common excuses of the Commonwealth are exemplified in
Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Mfr.'s Ass'n. Cas. Ins. Co., [76 Dauph. 275,
279 (C.P. Pa. 1960), exceptions on other grounds overruled, 78 Dauph. 28
(C.P. Pa. 1961), modified on other grounds, 410 Pa. 207, 188 A.2d 729
(1963) ] which lists as excuses: "Pairing of returns, report of change, study
of policy determination, study of other Insurance Companies, failure of
Auditor General to concur, reference to the Board of Finance and Revenue,
obtaining an opinion from the Department of Justice, comparison of tax
reports with Insurance Department Reports, and diverse other reasons."
26. Commonwealth v. Allied Bldg. Credits, Inc., 385 Pa. 370, 123 A.2d
686 (1956).
27. Commonwealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 423 Pa. 101,
223 A.2d 223, af!'g on reargument, 419 Pa. 497, 223 A.2d 223 (1966).
28. Record at 37a, Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 90 Dauph. 251,
afl'd, 435 Pa. 525, 257 A.2d 530 (1969).
A second type of pairing is the comparison of different types
of tax returns of the same corporation for the same tax year. An
example would be the comparison of a corporation's capital stock
return with its corporate net income return. Since there is a
correlation between the earnings and the valuation factors of the
capital stock tax, this comparison is valuable.
2 9
A third type of pairing is the comparison of returns between
related companies such as a parent and a subsidiary. This is neces-
sary to insure a proper balance of capital stock values, exemp-
tions, and to determine the extent of inter-company trans-actions.3 0
Pairing had been well accepted by the Dauphin County Courts
in conjunction with other excuses as an adequate reason for de-
lay.3 ' It cannot, therefore, be said that pairing alone was the
basis for the decisions.
Time provided by statute may be beyond the one year limit.
In the settlement of a capital stock tax return the Depart-
ment of Revenue is the settlor.3 2 After the Department of Reve-
nue has made a tentative settlement, it forwards this to the De-
partment of the Auditor General for approval.33 The Department
of Revenue and the Department of the Auditor General have four
months in which to reach agreement.3 4 If agreement is not
reached, the conflicting settlements are submitted to the Board of
Finance and Revenue. 5 The Board has three months to reach a
decision3 6 and should it fail to reach a decision, the Department of
Revenue's settlement automatically becomes valid.3 7 Thus, a total
of seven months is provided for other departments after the De-
partment of Revenue makes initial tentative settlement.
The Commonwealth has one year from the end of the tax
year to settle the return, "as far as possible." A calendar year
taxpayer is not required to file the capital stock return until
April 15,38 which leaves eight and one-half months for settle-
29. Id. at 39a.
30. Brief for Appellee upon reargument at 21, Commonwealth v. Safe
Harbor Water Power Corp., 423 Pa. 101, 223 A.2d 223 (1966).
31. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Mfr.'s Ass'n. Cas. Ins. Co., 78
Dauph. 275 (C.P. Pa. 1960), exceptions on other grounds overruled, 78
Dauph. 28 (1961), modified on other grounds, 410 Pa. 207, 188 A.2d 729
,(1963); Commonwealth v. Anndale Co., 75 Dauph. 250 (C.P. Pa. 1960);
Commonwealth v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 75 Dauph. 106 (C.P. Pa. 1960); Com-
monwealth v. Lehval Indus., Inc., 75 Dauph. 245 (C.P. Pa. 1959); Common-
wealth v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 71 Dauph. 7 (C.P. Pa. 1957).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 801(a) (1949).
33. Id. § 802(a).
34. Id. § 802(e).
35. Id. § 802(e).
36. Id. § 802(f).
37. Id. § 802(f).
38. Id. § 707 (Supp. 1969).
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ment. Subtracting the seven months allotted to the Auditor Gen-
eral and the Board of Finance, only one and one-half months remain
for the Department of Revenue to make a tentative settlement for
all calendar year corporations. Because of the large number of
returns, 9 it does not appear realistic to require a strict adherence
to the time restriction. Further, if a taxpayer is granted a sixty
day extension 40 to file his return, it is not possible for the var-
ious departments to have the time allotted by statute and still
settle within one year.41 The Department of Revenue would
have to settle one-half month prior to its receiving the return.
The phrase, "as far as possible," when used with the one year time
limit, indicates that the legislature probably foresaw such dif-
ficulties and was making the time limit directory rather than
mandatory.
Investigation
Investigation by the Department of Revenue had been held to
be an appropriate reason for a delay in settlement.42 However,
in Commonwealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp.,45 the ap-
propriateness of delay due to investigation was rejected by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court which stated: "The Commonwealth
may investigate as it pleases, but it must settle within the statu-
tory period.144 The court was following its original contention
that generally the delay must originate with the taxpayer in order
to excuse the Commonwealth's settlement after one year. In two
decisions of the lower court,45 investigation has been upheld as a
further reason, along with other factors such as pairing, sufficient
to justify delay. If the reasoning of the lower court cases was fol-
lowed, investigations could be started whenever the Common-
wealth has need for additional settlement time. The investigation
would provide the necessary excuse to justify a delay. It is, there-
39. The Commonwealth handles the returns of 95,000 taxpayers per
year. Brief for Appellant at 45, Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 435
Pa. 525, 257 A.2d 530 (1969).
40. PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 72, § 704 (Supp. 1969).
41. Brief for Appellant at 13, Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 435
Pa. 525, 257 A.2d 530 (1969).
42. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Mfr.'s Ass'n. Cas. Ins. Co., 76
Dauph. 275, 279 (C.P. Pa. 1960), exceptions on other grounds overruled, 78
Dauph. 28 (C.P. Pa. 1961), modified on other grounds, 410 Pa. 207, 188 A.2d
729 (1963); Commonwealth v. Lehval Indus., Inc., 75 Dauph. 254, 255 (C.P.
Pa. 1959).
43. Commonwealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 423 Pa. 101,
223 A.2d 223, aff'g on reargument, 419 Pa. 497, 223 A.2d 223 (1966).
44. 423 Pa. at 108, 223 A.2d at 227.
45. Cases cited note 42 supra.
fore, not reasonable to grant a time extension for investigation.
The intent of the legislature could not have been to give the Com-
monwealth a settlement procedure which would eliminate any
significance of the one year time limitation.
Work load of the Commonwealth
In two cases 46 the lower court accepted the Commonwealth's
large work load as a contributing reason to justify a delay of
settlement. This excuse alone should not be a reasonable excuse.
It would encourage inefficiency and condone delays that occur
within the Department of Revenue. The legislature obviously did
not intend to encourage inefficiency.
SAFE HARBoR RULE- DELAY MUST ORIGINATE WITH THE TAXPAYER
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's second encounter with the
timeliness of settlement of corporate tax returns was in Common-
wealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp.4 7  The Common-
wealth took two years and ten months to settle the company's 1955
corporate net income tax return. The Commonwealth's reasons
for the delay were: (a) pairing reports with prior years, (b) pairing
the other taxes, (c) pairing with other reports in the system, (d)
investigation and legal advice, and the (e) effect of delay in re-
settlement procedures on subsequent years.48  Pairing was de-
layed pending resettlement for prior years.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in effect dispensed with all
of the Commonwealth's arguments by stating:
[I]n short, without completely foreclosing the possibility
that in a given case something may occur other than an act
by the taxpayer itself which prevents settlement, we be-
lieve that the only general basis for excusing a late settle-
ment is when the taxpayer does something to delay timely
action.
49
In the same paragraph, however, the court stated: "[W]e reaffirm
the principles in Allied Building Credits, supra. We believe them
to be sound."50
It is difficult to see how the principles in Commonwealth v.
Allied Building Credits, Inc. were reaffirmed by Safe Harbor.
Although Safe Harbor seems to have gone beyond Allied by putting
a larger burden on the Commonwealth, its effect is to have dis-
avowed the reasonable excuse rule. Under the rule stated in Safe
46. Commonwealth v. Anndale Co., 75 Dauph. 250, 253 (C.P. Pa. 1960);
Commonwealth v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 71 Dauph. 7, 15 (C.P. Pa. 1957).
47. Commonwealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 423 Pa.
101, 223 A.2d 223, alf'g on reargument, 419 Pa. 497, 223 A.2d 223 (1966).
48. Brief for Appellant at i-ii, Commonwealth v. Safe Harbor Water
Power Corp., 423 Pa. 101, 223 A.2d 223 (1966).
49. 423 Pa. at 105, 223 A.2d at 226.
50. Id. at 105, 23 A.2d at 225.
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Harbor, the Commonwealth may have a valid excuse but it is un-
able to justify a late settlement. The court's rationale was that the
Commonwealth has a one year settlement period plus a two year
resettlement period and since these two periods equal the time for
which the taxpayer is required to maintain his records, the time
periods must be strictly construed.
The Safe Harbor court stated further: "None of them [the
reasons advanced by Commonwealth] constitutes the kind of rea-
son which satisfies the statutory basis for relief."51 This is ob-
vious if the delay must originate with the taxpayer, since all of
the Commonwealth's arguments were based upon reasons that
originated with the Commonwealth. The court, perhaps being
apprehensive about the new rule, further stated: "Moreover, even
if one or more did suffice in theory, none is justified by the actual
facts. 15 2 The court then discussed each argument advanced by
the Commonwealth and explained why the facts did not justify a
reasonable excuse for the delay.
The court, by not completely foreclosing the possibility that an
excuse of the Commonwealth may justify a delay, cast a further
doubt upon its complete acceptance of the rule that a justifiable
excuse must originate with the taxpayer. What could be an excuse
originating with the Commonnwealth was not mentioned.
The constriction of the settlement time limitation is further
clouded by Commonwealth v. Western Maryland Ry.5 3 In that
case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted from Safe Harbor to
the effect that the Commonwealth can be excused from delay by
showing that it was unable to act or prevented from acting, and
that, generally, the only acceptable excuse is one which originated
with the taxpayer.54 The two statements taken together indicate
that, for the Commonwealth to be unable or prevented from acting,
the action must originate with the taxpayer. What is a taxpayer
caused delay appears to be the basis of the decision. Should this
be the basis of the decision when the statute states that settlement
should "as far as possible" be effected within one year? The
court has in effect eliminated any reasonable use of the phrase,
"as far as possible," and substituted the rule that the excuse must
originate with the taxpayer.
51. Id. at 106, 223 A.2d at 226.
52. Id.
53. Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 435 Pa. 525, 257 A.2d 530
(1969).
54. Id. at 529, 257 A.2d at 532.
Justice Roberts filed strong dissents in both Safe Harbor5
and Western Maryland Ry., 56 pointing out that the view taken by
the majority opinions is inconsistent with the holding of Allied
which had recognized that there were valid reasons why the Com-
monwealth would be unable to act or could not act efficiently and
properly. In addition, Justice Roberts considered the majority
requirement, that the Commonwealth must settle within the first
year regardless to the reasonableness of settlement and correct
its settlement within the two year resettlement period, to be
inefficient. Justice Roberts felt that the majority decisions could
also encourage the Commonwealth to make arbitrary and unreason-
ably high settlements which would require resettlements to be
made by the taxpayer. Both of Robert's dissents noted that the
majority opinions would give a windfall to taxpayers that have in
the past underassessed their taxes, since the Commonwealth, in
reliance upon Allied, may not have settled the taxpayer's return
within the one year limit.57 The majority decisions also encourage
taxpayers to underassess the tax in the hope that the Common-
wealth will, perhaps through a reasonable excuse, miss the one
year settlement period.5s
Justice Roberts in Commonwealth v. Western Maryland Ry.59
noted that the court had held assessment time limitations not to be
mandatory where the statute did not even contain the liberal "as
far as possible" language.6 0 Justice Roberts believed that the
statute1 may be interpreted as not being mandatory as long as
the right of protest and appeal are not effected.
COMPARISON OF THE RuLEs
The rules established in Allied and Safe Harbor and followed
in Western Maryland Ry. are in conflict. To require the justifica-
tion for delay to originate with the taxpayer precludes justifica-
tion based upon a reasonable excuse of the Commonwealth. At
present, the law in Pennsylvania as founded in Safe Harbor ap-
55. 423 Pa. at 109-12, 223 A.2d at 227-29 (dissenting opinion).
56. 435 Pa. at 533-35, 257 A.2d at 534-35 (dissenting opinion).
57. In Commonwealth v. Sherwin Equipment, Inc., 89 Dauph. 330, 45
D. & C.2d 587 (C.P. Pa. 1968), the taxpayer realizing the value of the Safe
Harbor decision, petitioned the Dauphin County Court to include in its ap-
peal the matter of timeliness of settlement. The court held that taxpayer
should have raised the issue in the administrative review process, which
had occurred prior to Safe Harbor, and that he was now barred from doing
SO.
58. There is no effect upon changes in the taxpayer is return due to
federal tax adjustments, since PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420n(7) (1964)
provides for Pennsylvania tax adjustment.
59. Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 435 Pa. 525, 257 A.2d 530
(1969).
60. Id. at 534, 257 A.2d at 534-35.
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 801b (1949) construed in Commonwealth
v. Western Md. Ry., 435 Pa. 525, 257 A.2d 530 (1969).
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pears to be that the excuse for settlement after one year must
originate with the taxpayer. In the lower court decision of Com-
monwealth v. Western Maryland Ry.,62 the Dauphin County Court
followed Safe Harbor believing that the principles and guidelines
established in prior cases had been disapproved.
63
The basis of the conflict is in the interpretation of the legis-
lative intent of "as far as possible" in the statutes regulating
timeliness of settlement. Non-technical words and phrases are to
be construed according to their common and approved usage.
6 4
Justice Chidsey in Allied used Black's Law Dictionary to define
"possible. '6 5 Based upon the definition of possible, he concluded
that "as far as possible" meant within reason or reasonable.
Justice Egan in Safe Harbor, in an attempt to give the tax-
payer more certainty in tax administration, looked at the overall
provisions of the statute and held that the time relationship of
the one year settlement, the two year resettlement, and the three
year record keeping requirement, justified a rule that excuses
must generally originate with the taxpayer to permit an untimely
settlement. 6 The fallacy in this reasoning is that it does not give
effect to all the provisions as required by statute6 7 in that it
renders "as far as possible" meaningless. It does not seem to
follow the intent of the legislature. The phrase must be con-
strued to have some significance. It should be construed as an
exception to an otherwise mandatory requirement which the court
cannot overlook.
Safe Harbor, in an attempt to maintain stare decisis, affirmed
Allied but in fact did not follow it. In Safe Harbor there was no
need to overrule Allied since the court found the reasons for the
delay were not justified by the facts.68 However, as Judge Bowman
recognized in the lower court decision of Western Maryland Ry.,
the law was changed.6 9 The Safe Harbor rule cannot be consid-
62. Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 90 Dauph. 251 (1969), aff'd,
435 Pa. 525, 257 A.2d 530 (1969).
63. Id. at 260.
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 533 (1969).
65. See note 22 supra.
66. 423 Pa. at 105, 223 A.2d at 226.
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 551 (1969), states: "[E]very law shall
be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions."
68. 423 Pa. at 106-08, 223 A.2d at 226-27.
69. Judge Bowman stated:
If the view expressed by the dissent correctly assesses the import
of the majority opinion, then most of the principles and guide-
lines laid out in our prior opinions on this subject must be con-
sidered as disapproved.
ered dicta since it was clearly the basis for the supreme court's
decision with the court using the words "even if"70 to discuss the
reasonableness of delay rule. The effects of Safe Harbor are not
within the intent of the legislature. The Commonwealth must
now settle returns when other returns, which give information
and verify accuracy, are not settled and are subject to change. The
Commonwealth must now settle within one year regardless of con-
flicts in the settlement of the return. In a resettlement even if the
settlement has been rushed, the Commonwealth has the burden of
showing why its own settlement is in error. This will certainly
encourage inefficiency and duplication of work in the government.
It disregards "the object to be attained"7 1 and the "consequences
of a particular interpretation.
' 72
The phrase "as far as possible" was in the original timeliness
of settlement statute.73 The capital stock tax was enacted in 1929
when the taxpayer paid his tax after the Commonwealth made
settlement 74 instead of paying upon filing the return. "As far as
possible" appears to have been originally for the benefit of the
Commonwealth, not the taxpayer, by encouraging an early settle-
ment by the Commonwealth in order to collect the revenue.7 5
Although Safe Harbor dealt with corporate net income tax, its
decision is interpreted to include the capital stock tax.7 6  To have
applied the Safe Harbor rule to the capital stock tax in 1930 would
have resulted in the taxpayer not paying any tax if the Common-
wealth had not settled within one year. This could not have been
the intent of the legislature. The settlement time was meant to
be directive not mandatory.
The effect of Safe Harbor upon the taxpayer is to encourage
underassessment on returns because, if the assessment is increased,
he will pay the amount due, and will have had, in effect, a loan at
six per cent interest.7 7 If the assessment is not challenged, his
"loan" is cancelled and becomes an unwarranted gift.
Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 90 Dauph. 251, 260, af'd, 435 Pa.
525, 257 A.2d 530 (1969).
70. 423 Pa. at 106, 223 A.2d at 226.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 551(4) (1969).
72. Id. § 551(6).
73. Act of 176, § 801(b), [1929] Pa. Laws 389-90, as amended, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 801(b) (1949).
74. Act of 176, § 805(b), [1929] Pa. Law3 393, as amended, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, § 805(c) (1949).
75. Brief for Appellant at 39, Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 435
Pa. 525, 257 A.2d 530 (1969).
76. Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 435 Pa. 525, 257 A.2d 530
(1969), in dealing with timeliness of settlement of capital stock tax fol-
lowed Safe Harbor, which dealt with corporate net income tax.
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 806 (1964) provides that interest is only
chargeable for the first year:
[I] f a settlement is not made within one year after the date upon
which the report or return was filed, no interest whatsoever shall
be imposed for the period between the end of such one year and
sixty days after the date of the mailing of the settlement.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Under the "reasonable excuse" rule of Allied the taxpayer
pays only what is due. If there is an unreasonable delay which is
detrimental to him, he may use the courts for relief. This was
done in Commonwealth v. Tonopah Mining Co. 78 where because
the Commonwealth was unable to meet its burden of showing that
it had a reasonable excuse, that it was unable to act. Therefore,
the taxpayer is protected under the "reasonable excuse" rule,
whereas, under the "taxpayer-originated delay" rule of Safe Har-
bor, he gains an untenable benefit.
RE COIV _DxATI OS
It is submitted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should
alter its present position on excuses for late settlement. The
present position does not give effect to the words "as far as
possible" contained within the statutes. The "reasonable excuse"
test put forward by Commonwealth v. Allied Building Credits, Inc.
gives effect to the language of the statute and protects both the
taxpayer and the Commonwealth from unreasonable manipulation
of the statute by the other.
Legislative action is an alternative which could bring quicker
and clearer results than may be accomplished by the judiciary.
The court in Commonwealth v. Western Maryland Ry. placed the
burden for change on the legislature when it stated: "It rests with
the legislature, not this court, to equalize the time requirement of
the fiscal statutes, if such a change is desirable.
' 79
If definite wording were used to set mandatory time limits,
it would save both the taxpayer and Commonwealth future litiga-
tion in determining whether an excuse was reasonable or not. The
legislature could require settlement to be made one year after:
(1) the return is filed by the taxpayer, (2) the return is due, or,
(3) after the prior year's Pennsylvania tax returns of the corpora-
tion, a parent and/or a subsidiary are finally settled, whichever
occurs last.
This suggested language would give the Commonwealth a mini-
mum of one year to settle a return. If pairing were necessary, the
time limit would not begin until after the needed returns were
available. All delays beyond the prescribed limits would have to
be caused directly or indirectly by the taxpayer. Lengthy litiga-
tion would be discouraged but litigation would not be prohibited.
78. Commonwealth v. Tonopah Mining Co., 83 Dauph. 279 (C.P. Pa.
1965).
79. 435 Pa. 525, 533, 257 A.2d 530, 534.
The Commonwealth should be able to extend the settlement
period into the two year resettlement period without having to file
a formal settlement. Presently, if the Commonwealth wishes to
use the two year resettlement period, it must file a settlement
within one year. If the Commonwealth needs additional time, it
must formalize a settlement and notify the taxpayer of settlement.
This forming of the settlement is an improper use of time and
subjects the taxpayer to the misbelief that the Commonwealth
tentatively agrees with his return. To simplify this procedure, it is
submitted that the Commonwealth should be required to notify
the taxpayer before the end of the one year period that it has been
unable to settle and the return will be continued into the two
year resettlement period. If the Commonwealth were not to
notify the taxpayer before the expiration of the settlement period,
the tax would be settled as filed. The combination settlement-re-
settlement period should not exceed three years. The taxpayer
would be able to know at the end of three years that his return
is final unless he contests it through the appeal procedure.
A maximum overall time limit from the date of filing should
be provided to insure that the taxpayer is not subjected to settle-
ment or resttlement proceedings for an indefinite period of time.
This maximum time limit, however, would not apply to a return
contested in the courts. The taxpayer should be required to keep
records until the settlement-resettlement procedure is complete.
The maximum period would limit the length of time records would
have to be kept.
Under the proposed system the taxpayer may be required to
settle or resettle several years after the return is filed. There
would, however, be little detriment to the taxpayer other than the
requirement of keeping records since the taxpayer would be pay-
ing only what he originally owed plus a maximum of one year's
interest.8 0
CONCLUSION
Timeliness of settlement of corporate tax returns under cur-
rent judicial interpretation of "as far as possible" phase of the
corporate tax statistics does not reflect the intention of the legis-
lature. The current interpretation removes all reasonable excuses
for a delayed settlement caused by the Commonwealth and en-
courages underassessments by taxpayers to gain an unjust benefit
if the Commonwealth, by a reasonable excuse, fails to meet the one
year limitation.
Commonwealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. changes
prior law where the facts of the case could have produced the
same result as the prior interpretation of the statutory language
80. See note 77 supra.
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expressed in Commonwealth v. Allied Building Credits, Inc. The
"taxpayer-originated delay" rule of Safe Harbor is unnecessary,
goes against prior decision, fails to give a reasonable meaning to
the statute and causes unjust results.
The judiciary can solve the problem by overruling, in a future
decision, the "taxpayer-originated delay" rule expressed in Safe
Harbor and followed in Commonwealth v. Western Maryland Ry.
A better solution calls for legislation to strictly construct the
time limitations for settlement and resettlement of corporate tax
returns with adequate provisions permitting the Commonwealth
to use reasonable administrative tools for efficient and effective
processing of tax returns.
HEuMAN RIcHARD AGLER
